In January of 1950, still reeling from the communist victory in China, US Secretary of State Dean Acheson gave a major policy speech at The National Press Club. In it he outlined vital US interests in Asia, a “defense perimeter” that included Japan, the Philippines and the Ryukyus. But it was what he left out of the address that was most significant. By not including South Korea, conventional history has it, Acheson sent the message that the nation was not worth blood and treasure to defend and was not a priority within the emerging containment structure which would define US Cold War policy.
Six months later North Korean troops and artillary were rolling effortlessly across the 38th parallel and Acheson was imploring Harry Truman to make the precise commitment he had greiviously omitted. The rest is history. More than 50,000 dead US troops and 65 years later the US still fully guarantees South Korean security as part of a “tripwire” force along the DMZ at the 38th parallel. There are more than 35,000 US Army personnel in South Korea and it is assumed many would parish in the initial stages of a North Korean assault; that’s the American guarantee.
Since the truce was put in place – the war never officially ended – North Korea, under three generations of Kim totalitarian regimes, has agitated to get the Americans off of the peninsula. This is more than a North Korean goal, it has also been a Chinese priority, and a Russian desire as well. The announcement of talks this week in Pyongyang between China and its client will probably be about just that, China reminding Kim that, despite enthusiasm for his new found moderation, China remains his only ally and will not be marginalized regardless what form negotiations with the US take. But at the end of the day both countries ultimately want the same thing…US forces off of the peninsula.
It doesn’t take a geopolitical genius to figure out they are playing Trump for a fool, probing to determine just how off the rails our diplomacy has gone. Adults like Mattis, and even back benchers like Bolton, understand any talks with the North must take place in line with our pledge that the South’s security concerns are paramount. It would be a sure sign that Kim is not really serious if he leads with a quid pro quo that US forces withdraw for denuclearization to proceed. That’s fundamental, like an opening 5 3 roll in backgammon…. except who’s to say Trump understands that, or cares? Nothing would surprise. Getting Bigly in a lather about a Nobel prize and a huge political win has trouble written all over it.
Trump has already made unhinged, fully uninformed noises wondering why we are still in South Korea. It should shock nobody if Kim, a winner from the outset just getting a US POTUS to the table, takes it right to Trump, threatening to end things before they start if withdrawal isn’t put on the agenda, which would immediately unnerve the South. Can anybody really count on L’Enfant Terrible, his hopes all up, his twitter feed laden with empty promises of success, to stand his ground and tell Kim it’s a non starter?
They call it a tripwire force because of its vulnerability. Should the North attack, Americans die, and the POTUS will have no choice because the electorate will demand we engage. Once there is no US personnel on the ground, our promises don’t mean a cup of coffee, particularly with a liar of poor character at the helm. South Korea knows this. That’s why it is a mystery they would be anything but gravely concerned at the prospect of this summit. Perhaps they still don’t appreciate what we did in November of 2016. They may be about to get an education. BC
Bigly sees NK reconciliation as his legacy builder. He will make any deal that earns him short term platitudes at the expense of long term security. China is not about to play nice in the face of economic warfare while Russia will sit back and laugh at this distraction as they engineer an even more insidious attack on our elections and democracy.